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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines acquisition performance from the perspective of acquirer 
capabilities. It argues that the strategic capabilities underpinning a firm’s competitive 
strategy can be utilized to create economic value in acquisitions. Acquirers with strong 
cost leadership capabilities are expected to leverage these capabilities to reduce post-
acquisition costs as they integrate acquisition targets. Acquirers with strong 
differentiation capabilities are expected to utilize their strategic capabilities to increase 
post-acquisition revenues by improving branding, product design, sales, and services in 
their targets. We also explore the affect of an acquirer’s effectiveness capabilities on 
acquisition performance. Lastly, we examine how acquirers organize these capabilities, 
either at the business unit or corporate-level, in order to maximize their affect on 
acquisition performance. Based on a sample of 204 horizontal acquisitions occurring in 
the banking industry, we find support for the link between acquirer cost leadership 
capabilities and post-acquisition cost reduction. Acquirer effectiveness capabilities are 
associated with improvements in post-acquisition revenues and profitability. We conclude 
that a better understanding of the competitive capabilities of acquirers is important to 
understanding acquisition performance. This contributes directly to horizontal 
acquisition research, but can be extended to several areas of strategy research on M&As 
including: diversifying acquisitions, acquirer experience, and how acquirers can avoid 
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Are all acquirers equally capable at making acquisitions? If not, what 
characteristics of acquirers contribute to creating value after an acquisition is completed? 
What acquirer characteristics interfere with value creation, or lead to value destruction, in 
acquisitions? This study seeks to address these questions by examining how acquirer 
capabilities affect post-acquisition performance. Based on theoretical and case evidence, 
we develop the concept of strategic capabilities and argue that these capabilities play an 
important role in acquisition activity. By linking competitive strategies and capabilities 
with the phenomenon of acquisitions, this research makes important contributions to our 
understanding of competitive strategy theory, resource-based theory, and M&A. Our 
empirical model provides evidence of the significant relationship between acquirer 
strategic capabilities and post-acquisition performance. 
This research is motivated by existing research on M&A, but its design departs 
from previous research on M&A by focusing attention on the role of the acquirer and its 
capabilities in creating performance improvements in acquisitions. Much of the existing 
research on M&A focuses on the diversification strategy of acquirers and how it affects 
acquisition performance.  This includes studies that examine different types of 
diversifying acquisitions and their affect on acquisition performance (Lubatkin 1983; 
Chatterjee 1986; Lubatkin 1987; Singh and Montgomery 1987; Shelton 1988; Seth 1990; 
Seth 1990; Brush 1996).  There has been some work on acquirer and target resource 
allocations and their affect on acquisition performance (Harrison, Hitt et al. 1991), and 
resource redeployment and asset divestiture within an acquisition and how it affects 
acquisition performance (Capron, Dussauge et al. 1998; Capron 1999).  In general, 
research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been criticized for its largely 
inconclusive findings and its failure to identify antecedents that predict acquisition 
success (King et al 2004).  
Why depart from previous research to emphasize the role of acquirer capabilities 
in contributing to improved acquisition performance? First, while much of existing 
research on M&A has focused on diversification strategy, it hasn’t directly examined the 
role of the acquirer and its capabilities in affecting acquisition performance. This is a 
surprising gap since research on diversification has been emphasizing the role of “core 
competencies” in corporate strategies for some time. Diversification theory suggests that   4
a primary motivation for diversifying acquisitions is an acquirer’s ability to utilize 
fungible capabilities associated with its pre-acquisition businesses to create performance 
improvements in the combining firms. 
Second, our research design, focusing on acquirers and their  capabilities, 
addresses a second criticism of M&A research - that it fails to consider an acquirer’s 
strategic intent and has not accounted for significant variations in the strategies and 
integration processes of differing acquirers (Bower 2001). As a result, acquirers have 
been described as falling into “synergy traps” or falling prey to management hubris since 
most studies show M&As fail to achieve economic gains, yet we lack an understanding 
of what factors make particular acquirers more capable than others. 
Third, examining acquisition performance from the perspective of an acquirer’s 
strategic capabilities provides insights into several important topics in strategic 
management including competitive strategy, resource-based theory, corporate strategy, 
M&A, and strategic trade-offs. A great deal of theoretical and empirical research exists 
on topics of competitive strategy and the resource-based view, but there has been little 
work within strategic management research that integrates these theories and proposes a 
link between an acquirer’s pre-acquisition competitive strategy, its capabilities, and its 
ability to create economic value in acquisitions. Although the original motivation for this 
research project is to better understand antecedents that explain variations in M&A 
performance, its focus on acquirer capabilities allows this research to make significant 
contributions to a broad set of fundamental issues in strategic management. 
It develops the concepts of strategic and effectiveness capabilities and provides 
evidence of their affect on specific types of post-acquisition performance improvements. 
Specifically, acquirer cost leadership capabilities are associated with post-acquisition cost 
reductions and strategic trade-offs harming the combined firm’s ability to differentiate. 
Acquirer’s differentiation capabilities also affect post-acquisition performance and result 
in strategic trade-offs harming the combined firm’s cost position. These finding improve 
our understanding of how resources and capabilities affect the significant strategic 
actions of firms – in this case an acquirer’s ability to integrate and create economic value 
from its acquisitions. The findings also improve our understanding of how a firm’s   5
competitive strategy affects its capabilities and how these capabilities interact providing 
evidence of trade-offs between cost leadership and differentiation.  
In order to explore the question of how an acquirer’s capabilities affect its 
acquisition outcomes, we identify three sets of capabilities: those associated with 
differentiation strategies or differentiation capabilities, those associated with cost 
leadership strategies or cost leadership capabilities, and those associated with operational 
effectiveness or effectiveness capabilities. These different types of acquirer capabilities 
are defined in greater detail in the following section. We also examine how an acquirer 
organizes these capabilities, at either the business-level or corporate-level, and how these 
organizational decisions result in differing implications for acquisition integration and 
performance.  
This paper seeks to make four important contributions to strategic management 
research. First, it develops the concepts of strategic and effectiveness capabilities and 
grounds these concepts in case-based evidence, suggesting a way to integrate competitive 
strategy theory and resource-based theory. Second, it links acquirer capabilities with 
acquisition activity, showing the importance of strategic and effectiveness capabilities for 
both business-level competition and corporate-level strategic actions such as M&As. Our 
empirical evidence provides support for cost leadership and differentiation capabilities, 
their association with specific types of post-acquisition performance improvements, and 
trade-offs between these capabilities that interfere with the realization of synergies. This 
provides insights into resource-based theory and competitive strategy theory as it shows 
evidence of specialized strategic capabilities that directly impact a firm’s cost or 
differentiated position. The evidence of trade-offs between cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities provides additional insight into a fundamental issue of strategy 
emphasized by competitive strategy theory. Third, it examines how acquirers organize 
capabilities at both the business-level and corporate-level in order to improve their 
acquisition outcomes and avoid strategic tradeoffs. This is an important contribution to 
our understanding of how corporate strategy and business strategy interact to improve 
firm performance. The relationship between corporate strategy and business strategy and 
their respective effects on performance is a long standing topic of debate within strategic 
management research (recently highlighted by McGahan and Porter 2005; Ruefli and   6
Wiggins 2005). This research study shows that acquirers utilize corporate strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities to alter the business-level strategies of acquired firms in order 
to affect performance at the business-unit level. It also shows that business-unit 
capabilities and strategy contribute to the effectiveness of corporate-level capabilities and 
partially determine whether corporate capabilities enhance or conflict with those at the 
business-level. Last, it provides empirical evidence from a large sample of acquisitions to 
support the importance of acquirer capabilities in creating post-acquisition synergies, 
adding to our understanding of what types of acquirers are likely to be successful in 
realizing economic value in their acquisitions. 
Theory 
The theory developed below seeks to integrate existing strategy theory, relate it to 
M&A activity, and ground it concretely in evidence from existing case studies and 
strategy process research. It makes two main assertions. First, firms develop specialized 
capabilities as the result of executing their business-level strategies. These capabilities 
can also be utilized to create specific sources of economic value in a firm’s acquisition 
activity. For the purpose of this study, these capabilities are defined as strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities. Second, acquirers organize strategic and effectiveness 
capabilities at the business unit level and/or corporate level to improve their ability to 
extract economic value from acquisitions. 
Competitive strategy theory has been primarily viewed as directing its assertions 
at a firm’s competitive position within its external market. But, competitive strategy 
theory and research also argues that specific firm capabilities are associated with 
particular competitive strategies, most commonly with either cost leadership or 
differentiation strategies. For example, strategy researchers associate cost leadership 
strategies with capabilities such as procuring low cost inputs, highly efficient labor, scale 
manufacturing, and management capabilities that result in low overhead expense. 
Differentiation is associated with capabilities that include the manufacture and 
development of unique, high quality products, customer service, marketing and branding, 
research and development (Porter 1980; Hambick 1983; Dess and Davis 1984; Segev 
1989; Kumar and Subramanian 1997, Miller and Friesen 1993; Barney 2002; Grant 
2002).  Competitive strategy theory asserts that firms specialize in one type of strategic   7
capability – either cost leadership or differentiation – in order to avoid tradeoffs between 
these capabilities that affect performance negatively. 
Porter’s theoretical perspective on competitive strategy has evolved to also 
include operational effectiveness as an important element of firm competitiveness (Porter 
1996). Operational effectiveness is driven by capabilities which are not necessarily 
associated with a particular competitive strategy. Effectiveness capabilities include 
activities such as process reengineering, total quality management, benchmarking, among 
others which aim to improve firm performance by either improving a firm’s level of 
differentiation, its level of cost leadership, or both simultaneously. For example, a firm 
seeking to improve its operational effectiveness may use total quality management 
practices to improve the quality and reliability of its products while simultaneously 
reducing its unit costs due to lower scrap or warranty costs. One firm may use 
benchmarking to compare their customer service functions with a competitor in order to 
improve its differentiation strategy, while another firm uses benchmarking to implement 
lean manufacturing practice to improve their cost position. On average, effectiveness 
capabilities are expected to be independent of these specific strategies.  
In the spirit of X-Inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1978) and Porter (1996), these firms 
with low effectiveness are operating off the productivity frontier compared with other 
firms competing with similar competitive strategies. Thus, we equate effectiveness 
capabilities with the concepts of dynamic capabilities, which are primarily associated 
with economizing rather than strategizing to achieve a particular strategic position. As is 
argued of dynamic capabilities, effectiveness capabilities allow firms to effectively 
redeploy internal and external competencies in response to changing competitive 
conditions (Teece, Pisano, and Schuen 1997).  
Although initially developed as a result of day-to-day competition with industry 
competitors, strategic and effectiveness capabilities can be leveraged to support corporate 
strategies such as diversification and M&A. Acquirers excelling at differentiation 
strategies, those with strong differentiation capabilities, are likely to utilize their strategic 
capabilities to improve the differentiation strategy of acquisition targets (or the combined 
firms) and as a result improve post-acquisition performance by increasing revenues and 
net income. Differentiation capabilities include activities such as product design and   8
innovation, research and development, marketing, and customer service, etc. - those 
focused on achieving high margins through premium pricing. 
Similarly, acquirers with cost leadership capabilities are expected to use their 
strategic capabilities to improve the cost position of their acquisition targets, reducing 
post-acquisition costs and improving return on assets. Cost leadership capabilities include 
activities resulting in economies of scale in production and distribution, management 
systems that result in low overhead, and activities that use technology to automate 
manual activities, etc – those focused on achieving high margins through low costs. 
Lastly, acquirers with effectiveness capabilities are expected to improve the level of 
operational effectiveness in their acquisition targets, resulting in improvements in ROA. 
Case studies of bank acquisitions show detailed evidence of acquirer strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities and their effect on acquisition performance. The case of Banc 
One’s acquisition history provides an example of strategic and effectiveness capabilities 
in action. Banc One describes its strategy for acquiring and managing affiliate 
community banks as its “uncommon partnership”(Uyterhoeven 1993). In practice, Banc 
One’s uncommon partnership is a balance between centralizing and standardizing certain 
functions, while maintaining local autonomy at its affiliate.  
Banc One utilizes cost leadership capabilities to centralize its operations, gaining 
economies of scale in its backroom functions and information systems. Marketing 
capabilities allowed Banc One to create economies by standardizing its product offerings. 
Centralized procurement capabilities resulted in low costs in sourcing computer 
hardware, software, office furniture, equipment, courier services, and office supplies. 
Banc One also takes advantage of scale to develop differentiation capabilities 
within a centralized group by offering specialized products not traditionally offered by 
smaller community banks. Banc One’s diversified services group (DSC) requires 
significant scale to justify its investment in personnel with skills in brokerage and 
investments, specialized trust services, cash management products, and specialized 
corporate lending. Scale also supports investments in the computer systems, compliance 
functions, and dedicated sales and marketing functions required to offer premium fee-
based products and services (Uyterhoeven 1993).   9
As an acquirer, Banc One also provide an example of effectiveness capabilities in 
its development and use of its management information and control system (MCIS) and 
performance management processes. MCIS creates consistent financial scorecards across 
each of Banc One’s affiliate banks, driving affiliates to achieve high performance by 
using both cost leadership and differentiation capabilities within their local markets. 
Described as its “share and compare” program Banc One’s performance management 
processes expose performance differences between affiliates and foster cooperation 
between affiliate banks to share knowledge and capabilities at the business-level. 
Strategic and effectiveness capabilities may be organized and utilized at either the 
corporate or business-unit level. The examples of Banc One’s cost leadership capabilities 
exhibited in their large scale centralized operations and IT, differentiation capabilities 
incorporated in its DSC, and effectiveness capabilities based on its MCIS and 
performance management processes are all capabilities organized at the corporate-level. 
Other strategic or effectiveness capabilities exist at the business unit level and interact 
with corporate-level capabilities.  
In general, banks and bank holding companies organize business-level capabilities 
to match their competitive strategies to the particular markets served by their local or 
community banks. Corporate-level resources and capabilities complement these 
positions, allowing corporate functions to leverage scale and scope to achieve economies 
in operations, technology, administrative, and financial functions and/or to leverage scale 
and scope to invest in and develop specialized products and services. Both corporate and 
business-level capabilities are expected to be utilized by acquirers to generate 
performance improvements in the post-acquisition period. The specific approach used by 
any one acquirer to utilize its corporate and business-level capabilities is conditioned on 
both its parenting advantage (and its corporate-level capabilities) and its competitive 
advantage (and its business-level capabilities). 
Banc One makes use of business-level strategic capabilities in its acquisition 
strategy of “uncommon partnerships”. In order to maintain some level of local autonomy 
at an acquired bank, Banc One retains the existing management team and allows local 
management control over the range of products and pricing offered within their 
geographic market. Newly acquired affiliates are linked with experienced Banc One   10
affiliates with similar markets and size to improve the acquired bank’s ability to: 1) strike 
the right balance between achieving efficiencies gained through standardization and 
centralization and maintaining local responsiveness, and 2) avoiding negative trade-offs 
from making use of cost leadership and differentiation capabilities simultaneously.  
This ability to reconfigure a new affiliate’s operations, products, and other 
strategic activities to best fit its local market conditions reflects Banc One’s use of 
effectiveness capabilities. Rather than using its comparative strengths in strategic 
capabilities to reposition a newly acquired bank to a preconceived strategic orientation, 
Banc One and its “uncommon partnership” post-acquisition integration process allows 
acquired banks the flexibility to make strategic positioning secondary to effective 
execution. 
As the example of Banc One shows an acquirer’s strategic and effectiveness 
capabilities influence its acquisition integration activities, whether these activities are 
predominately focused on cost reductions (via cost leadership capabilities), revenue 
improvements (via differentiation capabilities), or a combination of both. Banc One’s 
experience shows its use of both strategic and effectiveness capabilities, which resulted in 
improving the pre-acquisition profitability of its targets from 0.6% return on assets to a 
2.0% ROA. 
Other active bank acquirers utilize corporate and business-level functions in 
similar ways (see Calomiris and Karceski 1998 for a series of case studies on value 
creation in bank acquisitions). Many have corporate-level functions that support 
acquisition integration activities such as converting information systems, converting 
target products to the acquirer’s standard products, training acquired staff on new systems 
and procedures, reviewing the compensation and benefits policies of the acquired bank to 
convert payroll functions and standardize pay and benefits. These teams also work to 
eliminate redundancies between the acquirer and target, centralizing operations, treasury 
functions, programming, and other non-customer oriented functions.  
Studies of other bank acquirers and acquisitions provide additional evidence of 
how cost leadership and differentiation capabilities are used in acquisitions. Harris 
Bancorp’s 1994 acquisition of Suburban Bancorp emphasized primarily differentiation 
capabilities and the realization of post-acquisition revenue synergies (Calomiris and   11
Karceski 1998). Harris Bancorp utilized its comparative advantage in marketing and loan 
origination to achieve additional revenue growth from Suburban’s local customer base. 
Harris also increased post-acquisition fee income through its expertise in trust and 
investment services, mortgage origination, and home equity lending. Harris used its 
differentiation capabilities in cross selling and up selling in product and services where 
Suburban lacked expertise and infrastructure. In the case of this acquisition, Harris made 
a conscious choice not to pursue post-acquisition cost reductions. It chose not to 
consolidate operations, to retain Suburban’s management team, and to allow Suburban’s 
management local autonomy. 
In contrast to Harris, Firstar’s acquisition of First Colonial Bank provides an 
example of an acquirer using its cost leadership capabilities to primarily gain post-
acquisition cost reductions (Calomiris and Karceski 1998). Firstar’s aggressive push to 
centralize operations and cut costs resulted in a loss of autonomy at First Colonial. As a 
result, a large percentage of First Colonial’s loan officers defected to other banks, taking 
customer relationships with them. Firstar realized significant reductions in costs, but was 
“blindsided by employee morale problems that hampered its revenue growth (Calomiris 
and Karceski 1998 p.92)”. 
In this section, we extended competitive strategy theory and resource-based 
theory to develop the concepts of strategic and effectiveness capabilities and argued that 
these capabilities can be utilized by acquirers to realize performance improvements in 
their acquisitions. For the purpose of this analysis, we defined strategic capabilities based 
on Porter’s typology of cost leadership and differentiation and argued that cost leadership 
capabilities include activities such as high volume production of a relatively standard 
product, automated customer service, management routines that result in low overhead, 
among others while differentiation capabilities include the development and production 
of specialized products, excellent customer service, marketing and branding, convenient 
service locations, among others.  
Effectiveness capabilities are defined as capabilities which are neutral to a 
particular competitive strategy, such as process reengineering, benchmarking, TQM. 
Primarily focused on economizing and allowing firms to recognize emerging 
opportunities and redeploy their resources and routines to effectively exploit them,   12
effectiveness capabilities can be utilized to improve firm performance by increasing its 
level of differentiation, or cost leadership, or both simultaneously. 
We illustrate the existence of cost leadership, differentiation, and effectiveness 
capabilities and their use in acquisitions by examining case studies of bank acquisitions. 
The cases of Banc One, Harris Bancorp, and Firstar show their development and 
utilization of strategic and effectiveness capabilities in their acquisitions. The case 
evidence also provides evidence regarding how acquirers organize strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities at either the business unit or corporate-level and how corporate 
and business-level capabilities interact to improve post-acquisition performance.  
Based on the theory and case evidence discussed in this section, the next section 
develops specific testable hypotheses. As we develop specific testable hypotheses, we 
apply the previously discussed theory of strategic and effectiveness capabilities to theory 
relating to mergers and acquisitions. As a result, these hypotheses are designed to 
examine how acquirers utilize their strategic and effectiveness capabilities to create 
performance improvements in acquisitions.  
Hypotheses Development 
With regard to merger and acquisitions, strategic management theory argues that 
acquisitions result from market failures in the exchange of specific resources. Individual 
firms face constraints in their abilities to adapt and improve their competitive positions 
due to the rigidity of existing routines and bounded rationality (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Lacking the ability to develop new resources internally or to deploy existing resources 
toward existing growth opportunities, businesses turn to M&A to obtain new resources or 
employ existing resources toward new product and/or geographic markets (Capron, 1998; 
Harrison, 1991). Acquirers are expected to make acquisitions where their existing 
resources complement those of the target, allowing the acquirer to make use of acquired 
resources or employ its competitive strengths toward new opportunities (Penrose 1959; 
Harrison, Hitt, et al. 1991). Consistent with this reasoning, research on M&A process 
typically emphasizes the role of the acquirer and the acquirer’s selection process as an 
important component in successful acquisition outcomes (Haspeslaugh, 1991; Hitt, 
2001).   13
Acquirers with cost leadership capabilities are expected to select targets that 
complement a low cost strategy. A target can contribute to the acquirer’s ability to create 
value through cost leadership in one of two ways. First, it can allow the acquirer to 
employ its existing resource advantage toward new markets (Harrison, Hitt, et al. 1991) 
and/or inefficiencies inherent in the target.  Second, it may obtain underutilized resources 
in the target that can enhance its existing cost leadership position. This can occur through 
resource redeployment and asset divestiture (Capron, Dussauge et al. 1998; Capron 1999; 
Capron, Mitchell et al. 2001). The market for corporate control also makes this argument, 
suggesting that acquirers with strong competitive positions acquire targets with 
underutilized or mismanaged assets (Jensen and Ruback 1983). 
From the perspective of competitive strategy theory, acquirers utilizing cost 
leadership capabilities are likely to identify opportunities for cost reductions in their 
acquisitions. They are expected to focus on eliminating redundancies and waste, 
centralizing operations, downsizing staff functions and cutting overhead, and 
standardizing products to allow for efficient, large scale production. Cost leader acquirers 
are likely to eliminate poor performing products, operations, and sales or service 
locations. Examples of acquirers utilizing cost leadership capabilities include Cooper 
Industries (Collis and Stuart 1995), Firstar Bank (Calomiris and Karceski 1998), Banc 
One (Uyterhoeven 1993), and Wells Fargo (Schmitt 1986).  
Strategy theory argues that a firm’s management capabilities create and shape its 
opportunities for expansion (Penrose 1959). Thus, the acquirer’s managerial resources, 
administrative systems, low cost operations, sales, marketing, and distribution processes 
reflected in its cost leadership competitive strategy are expected to contribute to 
acquisition success. Thus, the capabilities of an acquirer are expected to determine the 
amount and type of post-acquisition synergies. These arguments result in the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a-b)   Cost leadership capabilities in acquirers are expected to be positively 
associated with post-acquisition cost reductions (H1a) and improvements 
in ROA (H1b). 
 
In contrast to cost leaders’ emphasis on cost management capabilities, 
differentiation capabilities include highly trained sales and customer service staff,   14
systems that support fast response to customer needs, product development processes 
aimed at unique designs and features, fast delivery and order processing, operations that 
produce defect free products that match a range of customer preferences, and brand 
management (Porter 1980; 1985; Hambrick 1983; Dess and Davis 1984; Barney 2001; 
Grant 2002). Along with these capabilities, differentiation capabilities are reinforced by a 
culture that emphasizes and rewards excellence in customer service, product design and 
delivery, and marketing. 
Acquirers with differentiation capabilities are expected to select targets that 
complement a differentiation strategy. Similar to the case of cost leader acquisitions, the 
target can contribute to the acquirer’s ability to create value through differentiation by 1) 
allowing the acquirer to employ its existing resource advantage toward new markets 
and/or products (Harrison, Hitt, et al. 1991) and 2) obtaining underutilized resources in 
the target that can enhance its existing differentiation position. This may occur through 
resource redeployment (Capron, Dussauge et al. 1998; Capron 1999; Capron, Mitchell et 
al. 2001).  
Acquirers utilizing differentiation capabilities are likely to identify opportunities 
for synergistic revenue growth in their acquisitions. They are expected to focus on 
making use of superior sales, marketing, and distribution capabilities. Acquirers with 
high levels of differentiation may also improve product quality and features and increase 
product innovation in their acquisitions (Harrison, Hitt, et al. 1991). Lastly, brand 
reputation may be transferred between firms increasing the sales of the combined firms.  
Examples of acquirers utilizing differentiation capabilities include Harris Bancorp 
(Calomiris and Karceski 1998), Banc One (Uyterhoeven 1993), and Cisco Systems Inc. 
(Wheelwright 1999).  
As in the case of acquisitions made by cost leader acquirers, the acquirer’s 
managerial resources, administrative systems, operating, sales, marketing, and 
distribution processes reflected in its differentiation strategy are expected to contribute to 
acquisition success. Similarly, acquirer’s selection decisions are influenced by their 
differentiation strategies. Differentiation acquirers are expected to target firms where 
their differentiation capabilities will improve the target’s competitive strategy and   15
performance or where target resources will contribute to improving the combined firm’s 
revenues. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H2a-b)   Differentiation capabilities in acquirers with are expected to be positively 
associated with post-acquisition revenue growth (H2a) and improvements in ROA 
(H2b). 
 
Competitive strategy theory also argues tradeoffs occur when firms attempt to 
mix differentiation and cost leadership strategies, resulting in weak financial performance 
(Porter 1980; 1985; 1996). But this assertion has been a point of debate with strategic 
management research. Other perspectives on competitive strategy have argued that firms 
making investments in mass-produced differentiated brands, total quality management, 
and process reengineering can improve performance while combining cost leadership and 
differentiation strategies (Karnani 1984; Murray 1988, Miller and Dess 1993). Indeed, the 
difference of opinion may depend on whether capabilities associated with different 
strategies have cumulative benefits or whether these capabilities substitute or interfere 
with each other. 
As the previously discussed example of Banc One shows, acquirers may approach 
acquisitions with strong cost leadership and differentiation capabilities (Uyterhoven 
1993). Can acquirers simultaneously utilize cost leadership capabilities to cut costs and 
increase revenues during acquisition integration, improving the post-acquisition price-
cost margins of the combined firm? Or will this add to the complexity of acquisition 
integration, resulting in increased costs and coordination efforts to reconcile post-
acquisition integration activities that pull in different directions? Ultimately this is an 
issue resolved by empirical examination. We propose the first of two opposing 
hypotheses: 
H3a)  Acquirers with both cost leadership and differentiation capabilities are expected 
to realize increases in post-acquisition revenues, decreases in costs, and 
improvements in post-acquisition ROA. 
 
Executing strategy within the context of post-acquisition integration is likely to 
create unique challenges for an acquirer with both cost leadership and differentiation 
capabilities. The capabilities associated with an acquirer’s competitive strategy are the 
result of routines and investments developed over extended periods of time. This is 
especially true in instances where an acquirer has developed a mix of both cost leadership   16
and differentiation capabilities. With the benefit of developing strategic capabilities over 
time, firms may be able to successfully blend differentiation and cost leadership 
capabilities while avoiding harmful tradeoffs. But within the context of acquisition 
integration and the time pressures associated with creating value in acquisitions (Sirower 
1997), acquirers with both cost leadership and differentiation capabilities may complicate 
the integration process with negative consequences.  
Haspeslaugh and Jemison (1991) describe the transfer of capabilities between 
acquirer and target as a process requiring time and an appropriate “atmosphere” that 
allows for learning both the routines of the acquirer and their organizational and 
competitive context. This allows an acquirer and target to evaluate whether transferring 
specific skills and routines improves the efficiency or effectiveness of an existing 
organization function or capability. They argue that “the organization receiving the 
capability needs to be able to understand how and why the capability worked in its 
original context (Haspeslaugh and Jemison 1991, p.111)”, whether it will work within the 
new organizational context in its post-acquisition state, and how to transfer and replicate 
or adapt the capability within this new organizational context.  
This is expected to be extremely difficult within the context of acquisition 
integration. Along with changes to operational and managerial processes which have 
minimal strategic impact but are required to link acquirer and target, cultural frictions, 
new reporting relationships, and challenges in coordinating and communicating the 
change process, all work to complicate the transfer of resources and capabilities during 
acquisition integration. Transferring conflicting strategic capabilities and determining 
whether the interactions between cost leadership and differentiation capabilities result in 
negative tradeoffs or positive operational improvements is likely to present a significant 
challenge. Under pressure to produce positive post – acquisition results, managers may be 
inclined to push for the transfer of strategic capabilities without fully understanding their 
effect on performance. As a result, we predict negative impact on acquisition 
performance when acquirers have both cost leadership and differentiation capabilities as 
opposed to strengths in either cost leadership or differentiation exclusively. 
H3b)  Acquirers with both cost leadership and differentiation capabilities are expected 
to realize decreases in post-acquisition revenues, increases in costs, and 
decreases in post-acquisition ROA.   17
 
An acquirer’s effectiveness capabilities are also expected to contribute to the 
realization of synergies in acquisitions. Effectiveness capabilities are those associated 
with operational effectiveness, which measures a firm’s ability to effectively execute its 
strategy regardless of whether its strategy is oriented toward cost leadership or 
differentiation. Effectiveness capabilities are aimed at increasing a firm’s technical 
efficiency given a particular competitive strategy position (Porter 1996). Thus, a firm’s 
level of operational effectiveness is independent of its choice of competitive strategy. 
Operational effectiveness is argued to be associated with dynamic capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano, and Schuen 1997) or capabilities related to execution (Bossidy and Charan 2002) 
and economizing (Williamson 1991). 
Effectiveness capabilities allow firms to adjust their competitive strategies to suit 
the needs of specific markets. Rather than making competitive positioning the primary 
focus, firms with high operational effectiveness emphasize the need to change and adapt 
to preferences of customers, based on effectiveness capabilities or dynamic capabilities. 
Thus, effectiveness capabilities allow firms to adjust to the changing competitive 
conditions within their industries, innovating to develop best practices and discarding 
inefficient practices in order to maintain high levels of performance and efficiency. From 
the perspective of dynamic capabilities, firms exhibiting effectiveness capabilities 
respond rapidly to market changes, innovating products and effectively coordinating and 
redeploying internal and external competences. Effectiveness capabilities which are 
focused on recognizing emerging opportunities and organizing to effectively and 
efficiently exploit them are argued to be more important than “strategizing” as it relates 
to achieving a particular competitive position, such as low cost or differentiation (Teece, 
Pisano and Schuen 1997; Williamson 1991).  
Similar to strategic capabilities, we hypothesize that effectiveness capabilities can 
be utilized and transferred to create economic value in acquisitions. Acquirers with 
effectiveness capabilities are expected to utilize these capabilities in acquisition 
integration. Acquirers with high levels of effectiveness are expected to improve post-
acquisition performance by fine-tuning the target’s competitive strategy to best fit its 
specific market. Rather than managing acquisition integration activities with the goal of   18
achieving a specific strategic position, acquirers with effectiveness capabilities are 
expected to maintain flexibility within integrating the combining firms in order to achieve 
the most effective strategic position. Hitt, Harrison and Ireland argue that maintaining 
flexibility in the post-acquisition integration process is essential to acquisition success 
(Hitt et al 2001). Since effectiveness capabilities are not expected to be associated with a 
specific competitive strategy, effectiveness capabilities in an acquirer are not expected to 
be associated specifically with post-acquisition cost reductions or revenue improvements, 
but enable either or both depending on the opportunities that surface as integration 
progresses. This results in the following hypothesis:  
H4)   Effectiveness capabilities in acquirers are expected to be positively associated 
with post-acquisition performance improvements in ROA. 
 
In summary, the capabilities developed by acquirers as a result of achieving a 
competitive strategy position and operational effectiveness provide the means for 
realizing potential synergies. Acquirers utilizing cost leadership capabilities are likely to 
select targets which will benefit from the acquirer’s comparative advantage in cost 
leadership capabilities, manage integration to exploit cost leadership capabilities, and 
realize post-acquisition synergies through cost reductions.  Acquirers utilizing 
differentiation capabilities are expected to select targets which will gain from the 
acquirer’s comparative advantage in differentiation capabilities, manage integration to 
exploit capabilities in product design, marketing, or service, and realize synergistic 
revenue growth. Acquirers with effectiveness capabilities are hypothesized to improve 
the acquirer’s acquisition integration processes and improve overall acquisition 
performance. 
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The case studies of Banc One, Harris Bancorp, and Firstar provide rich detail of 
how acquirers use strategic and effectiveness capabilities in their acquisitions. These 
capabilities, originally developed as a result of day-to-day competition against industry   19
rivals, can be utilized in the context of acquisition integration to improve the competitive 
strategy and operational effectiveness of the acquired firm or combining firms. But, these 
studies don’t provide a large sample analysis of the effect of strategic and effectiveness 
capabilities on acquisition performance. Consequently, no existing study provides an 
empirical analysis of how acquirer capabilities affect acquisition outcomes. 
Previous work has looked at acquisitions in three basic ways. The first looks at 
the effect of different types of acquisitions (whether the match of acquirer and target is 
related or unrelated/ conglomerate, vertical, or horizontal) on acquisition performance.  
These studies would benefit by also paying attention to the acquirer’s capabilities and 
how the acquisition aligns to the acquirer’s competitive strategy. 
The second approach to acquisitions has focused on the role of acquirer 
experience in contributing to better post-acquisition performance (Hayward 2002; Fowler 
and Schmidt 1989; Kusewitt 1985). Studies examining the role of acquisition experience 
on acquisition performance have resulted in inconsistent findings. A recent meta-analysis 
showed acquisition experience to have no significant effect on post-acquisition 
performance (King et al 2004). Studies of acquirer experience would benefit by 
controlling for experience they have had with targets having similar competitive 
strategies.   
The third approach identifies motivations for acquisition that are tied to the 
productivity, either high or low, of the target.  The third approach has focused on the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of targets. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) 
examines the pre-acquisition productivity level of targets and how target productivity 
affects acquisition performance. Within their sample of manufacturing plants, they find 
that plants with below industry average productivity were likely to experience a change 
in ownership. Ownership changes of manufacturing plants are associated with 
improvements in productivity in the period after the ownership change occurs. This study 
seems to indicate that plants lacking strategic and/or effectiveness capabilities benefit 
from a new source of these capabilities in the acquiring firm.  In another twist on this 
approach, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) focus on the target’s pre-acquisition 
profitability and its effect on acquisition performance. Within their study, the target firms 
had above industry average profitability prior to being acquired, but performance   20
declined after being acquired. In contrast to Lichtenberg and Siegel’s findings, this study 
shows that targets that appear to have effectiveness capabilities, reflected by their above 
industry average profitability, do not benefit from acquisition and, in fact, experience 
declines in profitability in the post-acquisition period.  
Neither Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) nor Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) test or 
control for differences in the strategic or effectiveness capabilities of acquirers in their 
studies or examine how the capabilities of the acquirers affected their ability to improve 
performance of the acquired firm or plant. Relative to this research project, Lichtenberg 
and Siegel show that a lack of effectiveness capabilities in a manufacturing plant prompts 
a change of ownership and is associated with improvements in productivity in the post-
acquisition period, while Ravenscraft and Scherer show that the existence of strategic 
and/or effectiveness capabilities in targets, indicated by their above average profitability, 
are associated with reductions in post-acquisition performance.  These studies would also 
benefit by controlling for the variation in acquirer capabilities in addition to focusing on 
productivity changes with ownership change. 
As detailed by review of  these three groups in the acquisition literature, this study 
shows how focusing on acquirer capabilities complements previous work on horizontal 
acquisitions and future research could extend to vertical, and diversifying acquisitions.  In 
the next section, we develop the model and discuss the sample used to test the proposed 
relationships between acquirer capabilities and acquisition performance. 
 
Sample Description and Methodology 
The following model is used to explore the relationships between acquirer 
characteristics and acquisition outcomes:  
 
Acquisition synergies = f [Acquirer’s cost leadership, differentiation, and effectiveness 
capabilities].  
 
The competitive strategy of acquirers is measured relative to industry competitors along 
dimensions of cost leadership and differentiation. Operational effectiveness is a fourth 
measure of acquirer competitiveness used in the study. Post-acquisition performance   21
improvements are measured as changes in accounting performance between the pre-
acquisition period and post-acquisition period. These measures are described in greater 
detail later in this section. 
  The sample is drawn from the population of U.S. commercial and savings banks 
operating between 1993 and 1998. Accounting data was acquired from the Federal 
Reserve and includes data provided by all U.S. banks via FDIC call reports. Call reports 
are required by regulation and used by federal and state bank examiners to assess the 
safety and soundness of U.S. financial institutions (Siems and Barr 1998). This database 
has the benefit of including information on the entire population of U.S. banks and 
containing high quality accounting information due to its scrutiny by bank examiners. 
  The sample contains observations on 8,881 banks and bank holding companies 
(BHC). Accounting information is aggregated to the parent entity (when a BHC existed) 
under the assumption that acquisition activity is associated with the highest level of a 
banking organization. The sample of acquirers and targets includes 230 matched pairs 
from bank acquisitions that occurred in 1994 and 1995. Information on mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking industry is drawn from the journal Mergers & Acquisitions 
and includes all acquisitions with information on both acquirers and targets in the sample 
of 8,881 banks. The sample of acquisitions was reduced by 26 observations, which were 
identified as outliers and eliminated from the sample (18 observations with excessive 
DFIT values) and eight observations that were missing performance information, 
resulting in a final sample of 204 bank acquisitions (Neter et al 1996).   
Dependent Variables: Three measures of post-acquisition performance improvements are 
used in this study: change in ROA (ΔROA), change in cost (ΔCOSTS), and change in 
revenue (ΔREV). These measures are consistent with measures of economic value used 
in M&A studies used in strategy (Seth 1990; Harrison, Hitt, et al 1991) and economic 
research (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). Each is calculated by netting the aggregate 
accounting performance of the individual firms during the year prior to acquisition from 
the accounting performance during the three years after the acquisition. The change in 
ROA is calculated as follows:  
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ΔROA = (ΣNet IncomeC / ΣAssetsC)t,t+1,t+2  – (Net IncomeA + Net IncomeT)t-1/(AssetsA + 
AssetsT)t-1,  
 
where: Net IncomeA, Net IncomeT, Net IncomeC are the values of net income associated 
with acquirers, targets, and combined banks (post-acquisition) respectively. 
The change in costs (ΔCOSTS) and revenues (ΔREV) are calculated likewise 
using the pre-acquisition (t-1) and post-acquisition (year of acquisition plus two years 
following acquisition) cost levels and revenues levels. The equation would be identical to 
the calculation for ΔROA with either total costs or total revenue substituted for net 
income. Using a three-year period to evaluate post-acquisition synergies is similar to 
Ravenscraft and Scherer’s study (1987). 
Independent Variables: The independent variables used in the models include three 
instruments: two measuring dimensions of competitive strategy and one measuring 
operational effectiveness. These measures capture the acquirer’s differentiation, cost 
leadership, effectiveness capabilities prior to making the acquisition along with a term to 
examine the interaction between cost leadership and differentiation capabilities. These 
measures and their proposed effects on acquisition synergies are summarized in Table 
3.1. 
We base our methodology for assessing cost leadership and differentiation on 
Miller and Dess (1993). This methodology measures cost leadership and differentiation 
along continuous axes in two dimensional space. Miller and Dess measure cost leadership 
based on a measure of ‘relative direct cost’ based on a PIMS definition of this term. 
Differentiation is measured based on a PIMS score for ‘relative product quality’ which 
results from a company’s self reported assessment of a broad definition of product quality 
including factors such as product features, delivery, service, financing, and customer 
perceived sources of differentiation such as advertising and reputation. Miller and Dess’ 
study shows a positive relationship between differentiation and various accounting ratios 
including investment expense/revenue, purchases/revenue, marketing expense/revenue, 
R&D/revenues. Low cost strategies are shown to be negatively related to these 
accounting ratios.   23
Following Miller and Dess’ approach, a bank’s cost leadership capabilities are 
measured using a composite measure that captures the degree its property and equipment 
expense, its personnel expense, its other operating expense, its cost of funds, and its 
product pricing are below average compared with similar industry rivals based on market 
type (metropolitan, non-metropolitan, and rural) . A bank’s differentiation capabilities are 
measured using a composite measure of the degree its property and equipment expense, 
its personnel expense, its other operating expense, its product pricing, and product mix 
are above average compared with similar industry rivals (see Mudde (2004) for a more 
detailed development of these measures). Based on these measures, banks can pursue 
mixed strategies combining low cost and differentiation. For example, a bank could have 
low relative property and equipment expense and cost of funds compared to its 
competitors and high relative personnel expense, other operating expense,  product 
pricing, and product range, resulting in a position mixing cost leadership and 
differentiation. Similar to Miller and Dess, banks that correspond with Porter’s “stuck-in-
the-middle” strategy exhibit a lack of both low cost and differentiation with operating 
ratios that are near industry average across all dimensions. 
The independent variable used to measure the effectiveness capabilities of the 
banks within the sample is based on a data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Charnes, 
Cooper et al. 1978) for all of the banks in the full sample. The actual model used in this 
study is based on Siems and Barr (1998). It reflects a bank’s technical efficiency in 
converting five critical inputs (salary expense, premises and other fixed expense, other 
non-interest expense, interest expense, and purchased funds) into three income-
generating outputs (interest income, non-interest income, and earning assets). Sample 
statistics and correlations are shown in Table 3.2.  
The methodology used to test the proposed hypotheses uses OLS regression 
models. Model 1 uses ΔROA as its dependent variable. It includes independent variables 
of acquirers’ competitive strategy and operational effectiveness. Model 2 is similar to 
Model 1 but uses ΔCOSTS as the dependent variable. Model 3 uses ΔREV as its 
dependent variable. Control variables included measures of asset size, whether a bank 
was organized as a bank holding company (BHC) or not, and indicator variables to 
identify whether the bank is located in an urban market (population greater than 1   24
million), a mid-size market (population between 1 million and 50,000), or a rural market 
(population below 50,000). In order to maintain consistency with Porter’s full typology of 
competitive strategies, focused strategies are identified by an indicator variable for banks 
in the bottom 20% based on asset size. None of the acquirers in the sample were 
identified as having a focused strategy. As a result, a variable accounting for focus/broad 
strategies is not included in the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, or the regression 
models. Only banks in the sample with broad strategies made acquisitions during the 
period used in the study. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Before proceeding to examine the specific hypotheses, we first test whether 
acquiring banks have accounting performance that differs from that of non-acquiring 
banks. Comparing the mean change between pre- and post-acquisition ROA for each 
acquisition with the mean change in ROA from the same time periods for banks not 
involved in acquisitions shows no significant difference in accounting performance 
between acquisition banks and non-acquisition banks (F = 1.09, p<0.298). This evidence 
shows that, in general, banks executing acquisitions achieve no measurable performance 
improvements or declines relative to competitors that were not active in the M&A 
market. 
This does not mean that all bank acquisitions fail to produce improvement in 
ROA. It also doesn’t mean that acquirer strategic and effectiveness capabilities have no 
affect on acquisition performance. Model 1 in Table 3.3 shows the relationship between 
acquirer cost leadership, differentiation, and effectiveness capabilities, and post 
acquisition performance. Two of the four hypothesized independent variables have 
significant effects on post-acquisition ROA. Model 2 using ΔCOSTS as the dependent 
variable and model 3 using ΔREV as a dependent variable show that cost leadership, 
differentiation, mixed strategies (DIFF * COSTLEAD), and operational effectiveness all 
have significant relationships with post-acquisition partial synergies of cost reductions   25
and/or revenue growth. Models 2 and 3 are used to provide greater detail regarding how 
acquirers create economic gains from acquisitions via post-acquisition cost reductions or 
revenue growth, respectively. The results of each of the models are reviewed below for 
each independent variable used in the model. 
Hypothesis 1a-b predicts that an acquirer’s cost leadership capabilities are 
expected to be associated with post-acquisition cost reductions (H1a) and improvements 
in ROA (H1b). The results of model 2 show the expected relationship between cost 
leadership capabilities and post-acquisition cost reductions. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the COSTCAP variable shows support for H1a: cost leadership 
capabilities in acquirers are associated with post-acquisition cost reductions (p<0.000). 
This finding provides support for the hypothesized link between the capabilities that 
underlie business-level strategies and type of performance improvement achieved in 
acquisitions. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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The evidence from model 1 did not show the expected association between an 
acquirer’s level of cost leadership and improvements in post-acquisition ROA (H1b). The 
reason for this is shown in model 3. Although not specifically hypothesized, model 3 
shows a significant relationship between an acquirer’s level of cost leadership and 
reduced post-acquisition revenues. This loss of revenue offsets the value of the reduction 
in post-acquisition costs and renders the overall effect of acquirer’s level of cost 
leadership on post-acquisition ROA insignificant.   
Hypothesis 2a-b predicts that an acquirer’s differentiation capabilities are 
expected to be associated with post-acquisition revenue growth and improvements in 
ROA. The results of models 1 and 3 do not support this hypothesis. The results of model 
3 show a significant and negative coefficient on the differentiation variable (DIFFCAP), 
opposite that predicted by hypothesis 2b. The coefficient on DIFFCAP in model 1 is not 
significant, showing no significant association between differentiaion capabilities and 
post-acquisition ROA (H1b). Although not in the direction predicted by H2a, the 
significant negative association between differentiation capabilities and post-acquisition   26
revenues is an important finding and may indicate the possibility that differentiation 
strategies of acquires may conflict with sources of differentiation in targets, resulting in 
the alienation on loss of target customers. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
conclusion section. 
Hypothesis 3b predicts that acquirers using strategies mixing cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities realize decreases in post-acquisition ROA. This hypothesis 
specified a direct link between mixed strategy and increased post-acquisition costs. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the DIFFCAP*COSTCAP variable in model 1 
shows that mixed strategies harm post-acquisition ROA. Examining models 2 and 3 helps 
to explain this result. Model 3 shows that acquirers that mix cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities achieve significant post-acquisition revenue growth (p<0.026), 
but increases in post-acquisition costs more than offset the growth in revenue. Hypothesis 
3b is supported both in its prediction that acquirers using both cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities in acquisition integration are associated with increases post-
acquisition cost (p<0.001) and declines in post-acquisition ROA (p<0.040). Thus, 
hypothesis 3b is supported, while H3a is rejected, which suggested mixing cost 
leadership and differentiation affects post-acquisition performance positively. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts effectiveness capabilities in acquirers contribute to 
improvements in post-acquisition ROA. This hypothesis did not specify a direct link 
between effectiveness capabilities and cost reductions or revenue growth. The positive 
and significant coefficient on the variable EFFCAP in model 1 shows that an acquirer’s 
effectiveness capabilities are associated with improvements in post-acquisition ROA 
(p<0.054). Again, models 2 and 3 provide detail about how effectiveness capabilities 
contribute to improvements in ROA. Model 3 shows that EFFCAP has a large positive 
effect on post-acquisition revenue growth (p<0.004), which results in the improvement to 
ROA. 
Lastly, the control variable for acquirer size is found to be significant and positive 
in its effect on post-acquisition ROA. The coefficient on ASSETSIZE is positive in sign 
and highly significant. Examining models 2 and 3 shows that the positive effect of asset 
size on ROA is the result of post-acquisition cost reductions that exceed declines in 
revenue, suggesting economies of scale in large acquirers. The indicator variable   27
identifying whether the acquirer is a BHC is not significant in any of the models 
estimated. This is also the case for the controls identifying what type of market the 
acquirer is based in. No acquirers are based in rural markets. The correlation matrix 
shows that CITY and BHC are almost perfectly negatively correlated. To test the effect 
of CITY in the model, a separate set of models were estimated - replacing BHC with 
CITY. CITY was not significant in its association with any of the 3 dependent variables. 
These effects are both significant statistically and economically. For the average 
sized acquiring bank within the sample, holding all other measures constant, a one 
standard deviation improvement in operational effectiveness is predicted to increase post-
acquisition profits by $1.0 million. Increases in asset size amplify the benefit associated 
with an acquirer’s effectiveness capabilities. The effect of variations in acquirer 
effectiveness capabilities on post-acquisition net income is shown in Figure 1.  
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Acquirers with higher levels of mixed strategies are estimated to reduce post-
acquisition profits by $1.6 million (based on a one standard deviation increase in 
DIFF*COSTLEAD and an average-sized acquirer, holding all other measures constant). 
The estimated economic value of the improvements in ROA associated with a one 
standard deviation increase in an acquirer’s asset size is $3.4 million of economic value. 
A two standard deviation increase in asset size results in gains of $33.4 million dollars of 
economic value. The escalating value of the economic gain results from two conditions. 
Larger acquirers benefit from 1) better accounting performance (improved post-
acquisition ROA) and 2) the larger size of their asset base, which makes an equivalent 
change in ROA even more valuable.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
These findings tell an interesting story about how acquirer capabilities affect 
M&A. First, this study provides additional evidence about the challenges of achieving 
economic gains through acquisitions. In general, bank acquisitions had no significant   28
effect on financial performance, since there was no measurable difference between the 
mean ROA of banks involved in M&A activity and those that were not. But, significant 
variations exist in the range of post-acquisition performance of banks involved in 
acquisitions.  
One of the goals of this research was to explore the question whether all acquirers 
are equally capable in making acquisitions and, more specifically whether an acquirer’s 
strategic and effectiveness capabilities contribute to better post-acquisition performance. 
Based on case study data, we developed the concepts of cost leadership, differentiation, 
and effectiveness capabilities. The concepts of strategic and effectiveness capabilities 
were operationalized and applied to the full population of banks operating in the 
U.S.from 1993-1998. Our sample of acquirers included 204 banks making horizontal 
acquisitions. In general, our findings support the hypotheses that strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities affect economic value in horizontal acquisitions. 
The evidence from our review of case and empirical analysis shows a significant 
relationship between an acquirer’s cost leadership capabilities and its ability to reduce 
post-acquisition costs. Utilizing existing cost leadership capabilities, acquirers achieve 
post-acquisition cost reduction by consolidating information systems and operational 
functions, eliminating redundant or low volume/inefficient products or branches, 
standardizing products to gain efficiencies and scale, centralizing or automating service 
functions, etc. Consistent with the perspective of competitive strategy theory, it appears 
that acquirers are successful at utilizing their cost leadership capabilities to improve the 
combined firm’s cost position by emphasizing standard products and services, large scale 
operations, and centralized control and management.  
Although not hypothesized, the finding that acquirer cost leadership capabilities 
are associated with declining post-acquisition revenue provides insight into competitive 
strategy as well. Competitive strategy theory debates the issue of trade-offs between cost 
leadership and differentiation strategies, namely whether or not a firm moving toward a 
position of cost leadership experiences a reduction in differentiation (unit cost improves 
while unit price, or value-added declines). Support for, and opposition to, the existence of 
strategic trade-offs has largely been based on anecdotal evidence or cross-sectional 
studies with inconclusive results.    29
This study shows that an acquirer’s use of cost leadership capabilities in its 
acquisitions results in strategic trade-offs. Cost leader acquirers are able to improve the 
combined firm’s cost position, but at the same time they incur a loss in revenues. In the 
context of bank acquisitions, post-acquisition revenue reductions can be the direct result 
of executing cost leadership capabilities such as eliminating low volume, low margin 
products and services and the indirect result of customers’ negative reaction to altering 
product features in order to standardize products. Customers may also react negatively to 
an acquirer’s decision to eliminate redundant or low volume branches and transfer 
customer accounts to different branch locations.   
Due to the strategic trade-offs resulting in post-acquisition cost reductions and 
revenues declines, acquirer cost leadership capabilities do not have a significant effect on 
post-acquisition profitability as predicted by hypothesis 1b. We interpret this as further 
evidence supporting the existence of strategic trade-offs between cost leadership and 
differentiation strategies. We conclude that, although acquirers are effective at utilizing 
their cost leadership capabilities in acquisitions, strategic trade-offs interfere with the link 
between cost leadership capabilities and improvement in the overall profitability of 
acquisitions.  
The evidence regarding the effects of differentiation capabilities on post-
acquisition performance provides additional insights into competitive strategy theory. 
Our findings show that acquirer differentiation capabilities are negatively associated with 
post-acquisition revenues. This result opposes hypothesis 2a and our theoretical 
arguments suggesting an association between acquirer differentiation capabilities and 
increases in post-acquisition revenues. Upon further reflection, this result is not entirely 
contradictory with competitive strategy theory. Unlike cost leadership strategies which 
suggest pursuing a low cost position by providing a relatively standardized product and 
achieving efficiencies through scale, differentiation can be achieved through a variety of 
means. Multiple competitors can achieve a differentiated position by emphasizing 
different product features, focusing product or service design to the preferences of 
particular set of customers, or emphasizing other dimensions of differentiation such as 
after-market service, timeliness of service, convenient locations, etc.    30
This creates the possibility for acquirer differentiation capabilities that enhance or 
conflict with those of the acquired firm. The case of Banc One shows an acquirer with 
differentiation capabilities centralized in a corporate function, its diversified services 
group (DSC). By centralizing this function, Banc One is able to develop the scale for 
specialized services in brokerage, trust, cash management, and specialized corporate 
lending. Managed properly, this corporate-level resource can enhance the mix of products 
and services offered by a new Banc One affiliate. The case of Harris Bancorp’s 
acquisition of Suburban Bancorp provides another example of an acquirer utilizing 
differentiation capabilities to “cross sell” and “up sell” customers into higher priced, fee-
based products where Suburban lacked expertise and infrastructure.  
The new, specialized services associated with an acquirer’s differentiation 
capabilities are likely to appeal to a subset of a target’s customers, since in many cases if 
these customers had a strong preference for specialized banking services they could have 
moved to a bank or other financial service company offering this set of products and 
services. Thus, depending on how aggressively these differentiation capabilities are 
applied to the target’s existing customer base, the change in differentiation strategy 
within the target’s market may be perceived as an enhancement to a target’s products and 
services or may be perceived as “hard selling” which irritates existing customers and 
results in customer turnover and loses in post-acquisition revenue. The empirical 
evidence indicates that on average acquirers attempts to utilize differentiation capabilities 
in acquisitions have a negative affect on post-acquisition revenues, suggesting that in 
general target customers prefer the target’s pre-acquisition approach to differentiation 
over the acquirer’s post-acquisition differentiation strategy. 
The evidence regarding acquirers with mixed strategies, who utilize both cost 
leadership and differentiation capabilities, provides additional insights into how strategic 
capabilities affect acquisitions. The combination of both cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities in acquirers is associated with post-acquisition revenue growth 
in acquisitions. This seems to indicate that combined strategies in acquirers improve an 
acquirer’s ability to exploit its differentiation capabilities more effectively.  
Providing further evidence supporting the existence of trade-offs between 
differentiation and cost leadership capabilities, mixed capabilities in acquirers is found to   31
be associated with increased post-acquisition costs. Acquirers mixing cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities face the strategic trade-off as well: improvements in post-
acquisition revenues with increased post-acquisition costs. In the case of acquirers mixing 
cost leadership and differentiation, we find the significant effect on post-acquisition costs 
exceeds the growth of revenues, which results in a significant negative effect on post-
acquisition profitability. We conclude that acquirers attempting to utilize both cost 
leadership and differentiation capabilities in acquisitions increase the complexity of 
integrating their targets and as a result increase costs and ultimately reduce the post-
acquisition profitability of the combined firm. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 
3b and supports the theoretical perspective associated with Porter’s view of competitive 
strategies, namely that cost leadership and differentiation strategy require trade-offs and 
combinations of these strategies result in lower financial performance.  
This study adds to our understanding of cost-reduction and revenue-enhancing 
synergies (Capron 1999). The evidence on strategic trade-offs supports the view that cost 
and revenue synergies are fundamentally different and, in some cases, appear to be 
mutually exclusive. It also supports the assertions of competitive strategy theory that 
firms face trade-offs in developing and executing cost leadership and differentiation 
capabilities. There are a number of possible explanations for the evidence that post-
acquisition revenue improvements are associated with increasing costs and post-
acquisition cost reductions are associated with declines in revenue.  
One explanation is Porter’s arguments that pursuing cost leadership and 
differentiation require tradeoffs (Porter 1980). This explanation suggests that altering the 
competitive strategy of the acquired firm (or combined firms) has a cost associated with 
the change. In the case of a shift toward more differentiation, additional expense is 
required to support the development of revenue-enhancing capabilities. In banking, 
differentiation acquirers (banks utilizing differentiation strategies and differentiation 
capabilities) may be especially concerned about customer defection during the turbulence 
of post-acquisition integration. Additional marketing and sales expense may be required 
to reassure acquired customers and generate brand awareness in a new geographic 
market. Investment may also be necessary to upgrade the acquired banks existing 
facilities and train its personnel to support a differentiation strategy.    32
 In the case of a shift toward cost leadership and the use of cost leadership 
capabilities, some revenue loss may be associated with cost reducing activities. For 
example, closing redundant or unprofitable locations and eliminating non-standard 
products is likely to result in the loss of some customers, resulting in a decline in revenue. 
A cost leader may reduce the fees and rates charged for the acquired bank’s products and 
services to align with a low price strategy, causing a near-term decline in revenues. 
Another explanation is that poor management or implementation, not strategic 
trade-offs, is to blame. Cost leader acquirers may be myopic in their attention to 
achieving cost reduction synergies and not recognize the corresponding reduction in 
revenues. Target management, lacking confidence and experience with the acquirer’s cost 
leadership strategy, may be inclined to unnecessarily waive fees to retain customers. As 
the previously discussed case of Firstar’s acquisition of First Colonial Bank shows, 
unanticipated employee and management turnover at the acquired firm may contribute to 
customer defection and reduced revenues. Similarly, differentiation acquirers may be 
myopic in their pursuit of revenue growth. Lack of controls during post-acquisition 
integration may allow high levels of expense growth while the combined bank attempts 
to meet its aggressive goals for synergistic revenue growth. 
Next, we discuss the role of acquirer effectiveness capabilities in creating value in 
acquisitions. Based on the case evidence and previous theory regarding dynamic 
capabilities and strategic execution, we argued that effectiveness capabilities are aimed at 
improving firm performance, but they may not be universally associated with a particular 
competitive strategy. Specific capabilities that have been associated with operational 
effectiveness (Porter 1996) or economizing (Williamson 1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 
1997) include activities such as benchmarking, total quality management or six sigma 
practices, and reengineering. These effectiveness capabilities can be used by firms to 
improve either their cost position, their differentiation position, or both simultaneously. 
Thus, effectiveness capabilities are not expected to be associated with a particular change  
in competitive strategy (either in the direction of cost leadership or differentiation) and 
should be exempt from strategic trade-offs. 
Based on the empirical evidence, we find that effectiveness capabilities play an 
important role in creating value in acquisitions without the negative effects of strategic   33
trade-offs. Effectiveness capabilities are positively related to improvements in post-
acquisition revenues, which ultimately results in higher post-acquisition profitability. The 
evidence from the Banc One case provides possible explanations for this finding. The 
case evidence shows that Banc One used its capabilities in forming “uncommon 
partnerships” between new acquisitions and experienced Banc One affiliates, its 
information systems, and its internal performance scorecard as effectiveness capabilities 
to drive performance improvements in its affiliate banks.  
Banc One uses corporate-level strategic capabilities aimed specifically at 
improving its affiliate’s cost positions such as those associated with its centralized MIS 
or operational functions and its affiliate’s differentiation position such as those associated 
with its diversified services group. In support of operational effectiveness, Banc One 
allows its affiliates the autonomy necessary to utilize its corporate strategic capabilities in 
varying degrees to best match their local market conditions. It provides effectiveness 
capabilities through partnerships between its subsidiary banks to share information and 
improve execution and through published performance scorecards that provide feedback 
on a monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. 
Previous research on M&A has advised acquirers to create an appropriate 
“atmosphere” for acquired firms to learn the routines or strategic capabilities of their 
acquirers and the organizational and competitive contexts that support the successful 
execution of these capabilities (Haspeslaugh and Jemison 1991). Other authors have 
emphasized the importance of flexibility in acquisition integration. We conclude that 
effectiveness capabilities are critical to acquisition success and serve to facilitate learning 
and flexibility in acquisition integration. 
  Additional research is needed to better understand under what conditions post-
acquisition revenue growth and cost reduction are mutually exclusive and under what 
conditions they are complementary. Additional research is also needed to understand the 
reasons that partial synergies (revenue growth or cost reduction) don’t translate into 
overall improvements in ROA. If strategic trade-offs are to blame, it suggests greater 
caution on the part of banks considering acquisition as a strategy for growth. If poor 
implementation is to blame, it suggests an integration process that focuses on managing 
both costs and revenues and the complexity of utilizing strategic capabilities within   34
differing organizational contexts. In either case, this study suggests that acquirers benefit 
from effectiveness capabilities, which are likely to address either problem. 
  Another goal for this research was to examine how acquirers organize capabilities 
at both the business-level and corporate-level in order to improve their acquisition 
outcomes and avoid strategic capabilities. Much of the previous discussion applies to 
these issues, but we highlight a few additional insights as well. First, while acquirers may 
benefit from developing cost leadership capabilities by economies of scale within 
centralized operational functions or differentiation capabilities by leveraging scale in 
business units to create differentiated, specialized products and services and organizing 
these capabilities at the corporate-level, acquirers should be careful not to autocratically 
impose these capabilities on its targets. The case evidence from Firstar’s acquisition of 
First Colonial Bank substantiates this caution. Firstar’s use of its corporate cost 
leadership capabilities resulted in an aggressive push to centralize operations and 
standardize products and services, but also caused First Colonial loan officers to defect to 
competitor banks, taking customers with them. As noted above, Banc One’s choice to 
allow flexibility in organizing and executing strategic and effectiveness capabilities at 
both the corporate and business-unit level provides better conditions for improving post-
acquisition performance. 
Second, we show evidence of how corporate-level capabilities and strategy affects 
business-level capabilities and strategy. The relationship between corporate strategy and 
business strategy and their respective effects on performance is a long standing topic of 
debate within strategic management research (recently highlighted by McGahan and 
Porter 2005; Ruefli and Wiggins 2005). This research study provides clear evidence that 
corporate strategic and effectiveness capabilities interact with business-level strategies to 
affect performance at the business-unit level. It also shows that business-unit capabilities 
and strategy contribute to the effectiveness of corporate-level capabilities and partially 
determine whether corporate capabilities enhance or conflict with those at the business-
level. 
Third, we anticipated that by organizing cost leadership capabilities at the 
corporate level and isolating these activities from differentiation capabilities at the 
business unit level, firms could avoid strategic trade-offs that might occur if these   35
capabilities were combined at the same level of the organization. The evidence shows 
that avoiding strategic trade-offs requires more that creating organizational distance 
between differing strategic capabilities. It requires flexibility in managing the interactions 
between business and corporate-level capabilities. 
Our final goal for this study was to contribute to research on value creation in 
M&A. The general conclusion of years of M&A research is that acquisitions fail to create 
economic value for acquirers. Indeed, some studies have concluded that acquirers fall 
prey to “synergy traps” or management hubris, but no research has examined how 
acquirer capabilities affect acquisition performance. Most research on M&A has focused 
on the acquisition as the unit of analysis without directly examining the acquirer’s role in 
executing and integrating acquisitions. 
This study shows the importance of acquirer strategic and effectiveness 
capabilities in creating economic value in acquisitions and avoiding problems due to 
synergy traps or hubris. It suggests that acquirers relying on strategic capabilities may be 
prone to synergy traps or hubris, especially those mixing cost leadership and 
differentiation capabilities. These acquirers may over estimate the value created in their 
acquisitions by focusing on partial synergies of cost reduction or revenue improvement 
without understanding the strategic trade-offs that interfere with net economic gains in 
acquisitions. The empirical evidence shows that acquirer effectiveness capabilities and 
size contribute to post-acquisition performance improvements. More research focusing on 
acquirers and acquirer capabilities is needed to develop a better understanding of why 
some acquirers succeed and other fail in executing acquisitions. 
The conclusions of this study are subject to several possible limitations. First, this 
study examines M&A in a single industry, the U.S banking industry. The use of a single 
industry sample allows for a more precise focus on measuring relative strategic and 
effectiveness capabilities of acquirers and how acquirer capabilities affect M&A 
performance. A single industry study is limited in its ability to be generalized to M&A in 
other industries or across industries. However, the findings of this study suggesting that 
effectiveness and size provide advantages to acquirers is consistent with the battle for 
scale and comparative advantage that is evident in the general M&A market. A second   36
limitation is due to the cross-sectional nature of the study, which limits its ability to 
determine the dynamic, or causal, relationships between the constructs used in the study. 
The contribution of business-level competitive strategy in realizing synergies in 
M&A is an important finding for many areas of research in M&A. While firm 
competitive strategy and effectiveness are of central concern in horizontal acquisitions, 
they are also likely to be important in diversifying acquisitions. It suggests another finer-
grained dimension of relatedness within groups such as related, unrelated, horizontal, or 
vertical M&A – relatedness in competitive strategy and operational effectiveness. 
Interestingly, the research on diversifying acquisitions may also include acquirers who 
exhibit primarily cost or differentiation strategies or effectiveness and use these 
capabilities to support non-horizontal acquisitions. (Maritan and Brush, 2003).  
Understanding the competitive strategy and operational effectiveness of acquirers and 
targets in diversifying acquisitions may explain variation that currently confounds the 
conclusions of research on how relatedness affects M&A performance (Lubatkin 1987; 
Shelton 1988; Seth 1990a).  
  Research on acquirer strategic and effectiveness capabilities may also be useful in 
understanding M&A process. This study has used M&A process theory to develop its 
propositions but has not directly examined M&A process or integration directly. The 
evidence that different competitive strategies result in different types of post-acquisition 
synergies raises interesting questions for research in M&A process. Do the competitive 
strategies of acquirers affect their selection, negotiation, planning, and integration 
processes? Case evidence shows some evidence that acquirer strategic and effectiveness 
capabilities affect these processes but, additional research is necessary to explore these 
issues further. 
  It also may be useful in other areas of M&A research. Topics such as top 
management teams (TMT) (Shanley, 1992), the affect of learning and experience in 
M&A (Hayward 2002; Singh and Zollo 1998), cultural conflicts and acculturation in 
M&A (Pablo 1994; Jemison and Sitkin 1986) post-acquisition resource sharing and 
restructuring activities (Capron, Dussauge et al. 1998), and many others could benefit 
from understanding of how acquirer capabilities influence M&A.   37
  This research offers several important implications for managers. First, it adds to 
the mounting evidence on how difficult it is for acquirers to achieve positive synergies in 
acquisitions. It suggests would-be acquirers focus on improving their operational 
effectiveness and building effectiveness capabilities prior to making acquisitions. This 
has two potential benefits: 1) it can contribute to immediate improvements in financial 
performance and 2) it can contribute to improved acquisition outcomes. 
  The benefit of large asset size presents a “catch 22” for acquirers. To achieve 
large size, acquisitions may be necessary, but acquisitions results are expected to be poor 
until large scale is achieved. This finding is consistent with the patterns of M&A activity 
in the banking industry, where the larger banks continue to increase their size in waves of 
acquisitions. 
  Another important implication for managers resulting from this study is the 
findings regarding the realization of synergistic revenues and cost reductions. Are 
manager misunderstanding their acquisition outcomes? Are managers of differentiation 
acquirers focusing solely on the creating of synergistic revenue growth, without 
recognizing that post-acquisition costs are increasing hand-in-hand with new revenues? 
Are managers of cost leader acquirers making similar errors in exclusively focusing on 
post-acquisition cost reductions? These are interesting questions for future research. This 
may be part of the explanation for the pervasiveness of hubris in M&A decisions (Roll 
1986) or “synergy trap (Sirower 1997).  
    38
References 
 
Anand, J. and H. Singh (1997). “Asset redeployment, acquisitions and corporate strategy 
in declining industries.” Strategic Management Journal 18: 99-118. 
  
Brush, T. H. (1996). “Predicted Changes in Operational Synergy and Post-Acquisition 
Performance of Acquired Businesses.” Strategic Management Journal (17): 1-24. 
  
Capron, L. (1999). “The Long Term Performance of Horizontal Acquisitions.” Strategic 
Management Journal 20: 987-1018. 
  
Capron, L., P. Dussauge, et al. (1998). “Resource Redeployment Following Horizontal 
Acquisitions in Europe and North America, 1988-1992.” Strategic Management Journal 
19: 631-661. 
  
Capron, L., W. Mitchell, et al. (2001). “Asset Divestiture Following Horizontal 
Acquisitions: A Dynamic View.” Strategic Management Journal 22: 817-844. 
  
Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, et al. (1978). “Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making 
Units.” European Journal of Operational Research 2(November): 429-444. 
  
Chatterjee, S. (1986). “Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions 
on merging and rival firms.” Strategic Management Journal 7: 119-139. 
  
Datta, D. K., G. E. Pinches, et al. (1992). “Factors Influencing Wealth Creation from 
Mergers and Acquisitions: A Meta-Analysis.” Strategic Management Journal 13: 67-84. 
  
Harrison, J. S., M. A. Hitt, et al. (1991). “Synergies and Post-acquisition Performance: 
Differences versus Similarities in Resource Allocations.” Journal of Management 17(1): 
173-190. 
  
Haspeslaugh, P. C. and D. B. Jemison (1991). Managing Acquisitions. New York, Free 
Press. 
  
Hayward, M. L. A. and D. C. Hambrick (1997). “Explaining the Premiums Paid for 
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris.” Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 
103-127. 
  
Hitt, M. A., J. S. Harrison, et al. (2001). Mergers and Acquisitions: A Guide to Creating 
Value for Stakeholders. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
  
Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback (1983). “The Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 11: 5-50. 
    39
Kaplan, S., M. Mitchell, et al. (2000). A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and 
Destruction in Acquisitions. In  Mergers and Productivity. S. Kaplan. Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press: 179-227. 
 
Leibenstein, H.(1978). X-Inefficiency Exists: A Reply to an Xorcist, American Economic 
Review, 68, 208. 
  
Lichtenberg, F. R. and D. Siegel (1987). “Productivity and Changes in Ownership of 
Manufacturing Plants.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics: 643-
673. 
  
Lubatkin, M. (1983). “Mergers and the Performance of the Acquiring Firm.” Academy of 
Management Review(8): 218-225. 
  
Lubatkin, M. (1987). “Merger strategies and shareholder value.” Strategic Management 
Journal(8): 39-53. 
 
Maritan, C. and T.H. Brush, (2003). “Heterogeneity and Transferring Practices: 
Implementing Flow Manufacturing in Multiple Plants”,  Strategic Management Journal, 
October Special Issue,  24(10),  pp.945-959. 
  
Nelson, R. R. and S. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Chance. 
Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press. 
  
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 
  
Porter, M. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York, Free Press. 
 
Porter, M. (1996). "What is Strategy?", Harvard Business Review, Vol 74(6), pp. 61-78. 
 
Ravenscraft, D. J. and F. M. Scherer (1987). Mergers, Sell-offs, and Economic Efficiency. 
Washington D.C., Brookings Institution. 
  
Roll, R. (1986). “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers.” Journal of Business(59): 
197-216. 
  
Salter, M. S. and W. A. Weinhold (1981). “Choosing Compatible Acquisitions.” Harvard 
Business Review 59(1): 117-127. 
  
Shelton, L. M. (1988). “Strategic Business Fits and Corporate Acquisitions: Emperical 
Evidence.” Strategic Management Journal 9: 279-287. 
  
Seth, A. (1990). “Sources of Value Creation in Acquisitions: An Empirical 
Investigation.” Strategic Management Journal 11: 431-446. 
    40
Seth, A. (1990). “Value Creation in Acquisitions: A Reexamination of Performance 
Issues.” Strategic Managemnt Journal 11: 99-115. 
  
Shelton, L. M. (1988). “Strategic Business Fits and Corporate Acquisition: Empirical 
Evidence.” Strategic Management Journal 9: 279-287. 
  
Siems, T. F. and R. S. Barr (1998). “Benchmarking the Productive Efficiency of U.S. 
Banks.” Financial Industry Studies December: 11-24. 
  
Singh, H. and C. A. Montgomery (1987). “Corporate Acquisition Strategies and 
Economic Performance.” Strategic Management Journal 8: 377-386. 
  
Singh, H. and M. Zollo (1998). The impact of knowledge codification, experience 
trajectories, and integration strategies on the performance of corporate acquisitions. 
Working Paper, INSEAD. 
  
Sirower, M. L. (1997). The Synergy Trap. New York, The Free Press. 
  
   41
 
Table 1: Hypothesized Relationships Between Strategic and Effectiveness Capabilities 
and Post-Acquisition Performance Improvements 
 







   Cost Leadership Capabilities 





   Differentiation Capabilities 





   Mixed Strategy Capabilities 
   (DIFFCAP * COSTCAP) 






    Mixed Strategy Capabilities 
   (DIFFCAP * COSTCAP) 






   Effectiveness Capabilities 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
 
Cell contents:  Correlation coefficients 
p-values 
V a r i a b l e N M e a n S t D e v123456789
1. ΔROA 204 -0.00024 0.00193
2. ΔCOSTS 204 -0.00313 0.00727 -0.132
(0.060)
3. ΔREV 204 -0.00523 0.00552 0.185 0.856
(0.008) (0.000)
4. A-COSTCAP 212 1.1357 0.7148 -0.027 -0.159 -0.164
(0.704) 0.023 (0.019)
5. A-DIFFCAP 212 1.5562 1.3734 -0.022 0.028 -0.065 -0.222
(0.758) (0.688) (0.355) (0.001)
6. A-DIFFCAP*COSTCAP 212 1.551 1.748 -0.087 0.044 -0.054 0.431 0.562
(0.216) (0.532) (0.446) (0.000) (0.000)
7. A-EFFCAP 212 0.64674 0.10396 0.086 0.038 0.15 0.337 0.021 0.277
(0.222) (0.593) (0.032) (0.000) (0.761) (0.000)
8. A-CITY 212 0.0377 0.191 -0.055 0.037 0.043 0.183 -0.16 -0.133 0.018
(0.431) (0.601) (0.544) (0.008) (0.019) (0.052) (0.797)
9. A-BHC 212 0.9575 0.2021 0.055 -0.037 -0.043 -0.197 0.178 0.147 -0.014 -0.94
(0.431) (0.601) (0.544) (0.004) (0.009) (0.032) (0.840) (0.000)
10. A-ASSET SIZE 212 15.059 1.817 0.173 -0.169 -0.195 0.006 0.447 0.386 -0.012 -0.208 0.243
(0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.931) (0.000) (0.000) (0.863) (0.002) (0.000)  43
Table 3: Results for OLS Regression Models: 
 
Cell contents:  Coefficients 
p-values 
Independent Variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.006317 *** 0.014805 * 0.001999
(0.000) (0.019) (0.673)
A-COSTCAP 0.0001048 -0.004046 *** -0.0030952 ***
(0.707) (0.000) (0.000)
A-DIFFCAP 0.0000045 -0.000901 -0.0008603 *
(0.976) (0.112) (0.044)
A-DIFFCAP*COSTCAP -0.0002684 * 0.0016026 *** 0.0008121 *
(0.040) (0.001) (0.026)
A-EFFCAP 0.002651 + 0.003865 0.010963 **
(0.054) (0.445) (0.004)
Controls:
A-ASSET SIZE 0.00027243 *** -0.0008523 ** -0.0005228 *
(0.001) (0.006) (0.026)
A-BHC 0.0005638 -0.004189 -0.002919
(0.531) (0.208) (0.243)
R-sq 7.9 11.6 13.3
F 2.81 4.32 5.03
P (0.012) * (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
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Figure 1: Predicted Effects of Acquirer Effectiveness Capabilities on Post-











0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Acquirer Operational Effectiveness
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
N
e
t
 
I
n
c
o
m
e